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reasons for thinking that we are perfectly justified in
letting the finding of the District Court on this point
~main

undisturbed.

Judge Gurfein's opinion certainly

stated the governing principles of Roth and Perry accurately,
and

I

cannot see why at this late stage of the litigation

we would encourage further dispute over what, under Roth
and Perry, are interpretations of state law.
in this conclusion, I

I

am fortified

think, by the way in which respondent

deals in his brief with the cases upon which Judge Gurfein
relied; as I read it, he in effect says "that is all well
and good, but here we are talking about stigma".

But the

main body of the per curiam deals with the stigma point, and
once that is out of the case on the merits I do not think
even respondent seriously quarrels with Judge Gurfein's
analysis of the New York law.
(2) Instead of the present content of the newly added

footnote 2, i t could be replaced by a statement to ~he

~ ~- ~
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COUrt of Appea1a dL5 not dec~de the iaeue

.,..._._, ill~eat ", and t:bere:fo~:e we have no occasion

, _ ~H

assy riew on i.t here.

t:M -tt:er open to tJie couzot

o~

Tbi.a woul.d preaumab1y 1eave
Appeal• on xemand.

(3) Adopt: ..Tolm • • ueableat of the "pxopaxty intexest"

.

b•ue ....Ued ia Put:
JCr

I»E'•~•rence

%%%

i• tM

of hie

:f~•t:

p~eaent:

4i•aent.

alt:enative, but. if

a
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Each of us can read for ourselves Part
~

III

of Potter's

opinion, 408 u.s. 576-578, analyzing the concept of a

property interest in employment.

I

quote the following:

"But the important fact in this case is that
they specifically provided that the respondent's
employment was to terminate on June 30. They
did not provide for contract renewal absent
'sufficient cause.' Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatsoever.
"Thus, the terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the ne£t year. They supported absolutely
no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment.
Nor, significantly, was there any state statute
or University rule or policy that secured his
interest in re-employment or that created any
legitimate claim to it. In these circumstances,
the respondent surely had an abstract concern
in being rehired, but he did not have a property
interest sufficient to require the University
authorities to give him a hearing when they
declined to renew his contract of employment."
408 u.s., at 578 (footnote omitted).
I submit that procedural protections of job tenure
incorporated in some statute or regulation pertaining to the
job classification itself are quite different than general
principles of administrative law, which frequently provide
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t:hai: i:he action of any public official which is "arbitrary
md capricious" may be set aside by a reviewing court.

Xt

aeama to me that this is what the holding of the New York

Court of Appeals in Talamo v. Murphy, 38 N.Y. 2d 637 (1976),
represents.

The action was ·brought under Article 78 of the

N.Y. C.P.L.R., which as

z

understand it ia the codified

equivalent of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

The

action of t:he supervising employer is subject to 1imited
t:e¥iev on ail •BJ:bit:razy an4 capzoiaioue" atan4ard, not

h c a - 1feW York confers any statutory or contractual interest

aoatinued employaent on probationary employees, but
hcau•e it does not vieh it• public officials of wliatever
IIBb&'e actLiaf

.ta ••

a~:.lduazy and

capricioua manner.

The

- 6 -

virtually certain that every termination of employees
heretofore thought t o b e nontenured could give rise to a

§ 1983 claim in a federal court.
It would also create a burgeoning class of other
property interests entirely apart from employee tenure.

In

effect we would be saying that if a state authorizes judicial
review of official acts if they are claimed to be arbitrary
and capricious, such review by itself confers on the claimant
a "property interest" which under the Fourteenth Amendment
entitles him to an administrative hearing unknown to state
law, or to exactly the same state judicial hearing which this

respondent has always had available to him under Article 78
but chose not to pursue.

Into such an abyss I would much

prefer not to journey.

Si~cerely

'wW'

